The 2025 LegCo election, age, and transparency | John Burns (Emeritus Professor, HKU)

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On December 7 Hong Kong people go to the polls to elect a new ‘patriots-only’ Legislative Council (LegCo). The qualifications for standing in the election are at the same time both formal and public and informal and opaque. The nominations process also lacks transparency. Surprisingly, in preparation for the election, waves of incumbents announced their intention not to stand for re-election. Turnover itself is not unusual. The way it happened, however, calls into question the formal published criteria for participating in the election. At a minimum they appear incomplete. The process also interrupts a trend toward more formalized, published criteria and introduces new informal and unpublished criteria in a way that may seem arbitrary.

Criteria for standing in the election change over time

Since 1997 authorities have interpreted and added to the formal criteria for standing in the election. First, from 1997 to 2016 officials identified the criteria for geographic constituencies as: : 21 years of age, a registered voter, lived in Hong Kong for three years, “uphold[s] the Basic Law and pledge[s] allegiance to the HKSAR,” a Chinese citizen and permanent resident of Hong Kong, and no right of abode in a foreign country.[1]

The criteria appeared relatively non-controversial until the Umbrella movement in 2014-15 revealed a polarized community. In 2016, using these criteria, Hong Kong voters elected six ‘localist’ candidates, some allegedly advocating independence of Hong Kong from China. What constitutes evidence of “upholding the Basic Law and pledging allegiance to the HKSAR”? The central authorities stepped in via National People’s Congress Standing Committee interpretations.[2]

Second, in the wake of the increasingly violent 2019 anti-government protests, the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee reasserted the policy that Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong meant ‘patriotic’ Hong Kong people. [3] And so patriotism was added to the formal qualifications.

In 2021 in preparation for the postponed LegCo elections, authorities in Hong Kong defined patriotic and unpatriotic behavior in law.[4] The Public Offices (Candidacy and Take Up Offices) (Miscellaneous Amendments) Bill 2021, lists specific patriotic behavior that officials expect of all candidates, such as “upholding the constitutional order” and “upholding national sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and national security” and many others.

Officials also produced a negative list (unpatriotic behavior) that includes obvious behaviors such as “advocating independence of Hong Kong” or “refusing to acknowledge the constitutional status of Hong Kong.” The negative list also includes crimes associated with the those convicted in the 47 primary election national security case and behaviors such as “compels or overawes the CE by any unlawful means to change a policy or a motion to be submitted to LegCo for consideration,” and “commits acts that undermine or have a tendency to undermine the overall interests of the HKSAR.” The latter behavior would seem to be open to interpretation.

Nonetheless, the bill provided additional publicly available formal criteria which officials expect LegCo candidates to meet.

A series of hurdles

Authorities have many ways to enforce the criteria. In geographic constituencies, for example, each candidate must obtain the support of from 10-20 Election Committee members, from 2-4 EC members from each of the five EC sectors.[5] I speculate that this is the first control point. In the 2023 district council elections, for example, potential nominators pointed out that they did not dare to nominate potential candidates “without Beijing’s blessing”.[6] EC members would have similar incentives.

Second, all candidates must pass through a second control, national security vetting. The Head of the Liaison Office sits on this committee.

Third, other control points include HKSAR government officials (returning officers and a local candidate eligibility review committee). That is, no candidate would consider running in the LegCo election without the support of these various gatekeepers.

Informal and Opaque Criteria: Age

In 2025 local media suggested that in the LegCo election central authorities introduced at least one additional criterion, that was both informal and introduced in an opaque process: an upper age limit. All incumbent LegCo members at or over the age of 70, over a period of weeks declared that they would not seek re-election. In at least one case, LegCo member and ExCo convenor Regina Ip, the additional criterion seems to have come as a surprise. Just weeks before apparently being notified that her candidacy was now unwelcome, she was preparing for re-election urging the public to vote for her.[7]

In a discussion of candidate qualifications, an op-ed in China Daily on October 21 made no mention of an upper age limit.[8] Other criterion appear, however, such as the need for candidates who will offer only constructive criticism (no “nitpicking… for political gain”). Also, no “protecting vested sectoral interests at the expense of Hong Kong’s overall well-being.” If these criteria are official policy would they preclude some critics of the government, now in LegCo? But they appear not to be.

John Lee : The Central Government’s concern and attention are natural

To be clear, the central government has complete authority to manage Hong Kong’s elections. Chief Executive John Lee reminded us on October 28 that the central government has comprehensive jurisdiction over Hong Kong. He also said: “The Legislative Council election concerns the constitutional order of the SAR, national security, and good governance. The Central Government’s concern and attention are natural, especially since the new Legislative Council is at a crucial stage of Hong Kong’s development.”[9] This is the closest thing we have to an admission of the central authorities’ role in the elections. Mainland authorities impose upper age limits on themselves, especially below the top leadership level. Could this practice have influenced decisions about candidate qualifications in Hong Kong?

The Liaison Office has long played a role managing and coordinating the pro-establishment camp’s election campaigns. This is a key part of ‘united front work’, the Liaison Office’s specialty.[10] In our opposition-free environment, however, since 2021 this role has apparently extended to the entire process.

Opaque and arbitrary

But the lack of transparency is problematic for several reasons. First, we are left to guess who or what is managing the elections. This opens the door to rumors and speculation, which authorities may not welcome. Second, citizens should know about the role of the authorities in important leadership selection exercises such as elections. Third, those most directly affected by the actions of these entities, the potential candidates and their supporters, should know what is going on. Otherwise they and their supporters are left upset, even alienated by the secrecy.

Referring to the process of nominating candidates for the 2023 district council elections, LegCo member Michael Tien argued for more transparency.[11] His middle of the road Roundtable was completely sidelined as his candidates chased nominations that the authorities had apparently decided in secret to withhold. Which authorities? Based on what criteria? Tien, over 70 will not be standing in the 2025 LegCo election.

An upper age limit as a criterion needs an explanation and a formal and public defense. What is the justification for a blanket ban on all those at or over age 70 regardless of expertise, experience, dedication and patriotism? Is this a one-off criterion, applied only in 2025 or is this for every future election? Can authorities introduce other informal criteria in an ad hoc way given that the process is opaque?

The upper age limit itself is arbitrary: why 70 and not 72 or 75 or 68? There are also accountability issues: Who made the decision? A consequence is to deprive Hong Kong of talent that it sorely needs. Without a public defense and clarity, the criterion appears arbitrary, which is not the hallmark of good and effective governance. We need better.

Notes:

[1] See 2016 LegCo candidate nomination form at chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/

https://www.eac.hk/pdf/legco/2016lcbe_nte/reo-n-gc-2016lcbe_nte.pdf

[2] Chen, Albert Hung-yee and Po Jen Yap2023. The Constitutional System of the Hong Kong SAR: A Contextual Analysis Hart. pp. 45-48.

[3] See Chinese Communist Party 4th Plenum of the 19th Central Committee, “Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Several Major Issues Concerning Adhering to and Improving the Socialist System with Chinese Characteristics and Promoting the Modernization of the National Governance System and Governance Capability” Section 12 (1-3), Zhōnggòng zhōngyāng guānyú jiānchí hé wánshàn zhōngguó tèsè shèhuì zhǔyì zhìdù, tuījìn guójiā zhìlǐ tǐxì hé zhìlǐ nénglì xiàndàihuà ruògān zhòngdà wèntí de juédìng, October 31, 2019, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2019-11/05/content_5449023.htm

[4] chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/2021/02/26/supp3/1

[5] https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202510/03/P2025100200751.htm

[6] Wong, Natalie & Willa Wu, “Hong Kong Opposition Parties Fail to Secure Enough Nominations to Allow Any Hopefuls to Run in Coming District Council Poll,” South China Morning Post, 31 October 2023 at https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3239724/hong-kong-opposition-parties-fail-secure-enough-nominations-allow-any-hopefuls-run-coming-district

[7] See also her circular to all constituents reporting on her LegCo work report.

[8] New LegCO: Choose right candidates for city’s future

[9] https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202510/28/P2025102800382.htm?fontSize=3

[10] Lo, Sonny Shiu-Hing, Steven Chung-Fun Hung and Jeff Hai-chi Loo. 2019. China’s New United Front Work in Hong Kong: Penetrative Politics and Its Implications. Palgrave.

[11] TVB News November 1, 2023 at : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2imBVx5P04Y&list=PLKoXXVQa3yxBlMRa-1lq0gDur_RstqgLr&index=7